The Duty to Treat Very Defective Neonates as ''Persons'': From the Legal and Moral Personhood of Very Defective Neonates to their Best Interests in Medical Treatment

The Duty to Treat Very Defective Neonates as ''Persons'': From the Legal and Moral Personhood of Very Defective Neonates to their Best Interests in Medical Treatment

The Duty to Treat Very Defective Neonates as ''Persons'': From the Legal and Moral Personhood of Very Defective Neonates to their Best Interests in Medical Treatment

The Duty to Treat Very Defective Neonates as ''Persons'': From the Legal and Moral Personhood of Very Defective Neonates to their Best Interests in Medical Treatments

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Référence bibliographique [4800]

Hurlimann, Thierry. 2003. «The Duty to Treat Very Defective Neonates as ''Persons'': From the Legal and Moral Personhood of Very Defective Neonates to their Best Interests in Medical Treatment». Montreal, Université McGill, Institut de droit comparé.

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Fiche synthèse

1. Objectifs


Intentions :
« The dramatic improvement of neonatal intensive care has produced vexing ethical and legal questions. One of the most striking issues is to determine whether the most defective neonates should be provided with intensive care and to what extent they should be treated. This thesis demonstrates that an attempt to answer this question and an analysis of the demands and limitations of a duty to treat defective neonates cannot properly occur without first considering the legal concerns and ethical issues surrounding the notion of ’person’. » (p. 2)

2. Méthode


Échantillon/Matériau :
« The author examines germane ethical theories and North-American jurisprudence. » (p. 2)

Type de traitement des données :
Analyse de contenu et réflexion critique

3. Résumé


« This thesis demonstrates that in the context of the cessation or non-inition of intensive care, the legal and moral status of very defective neonates remain ambiguous. In particular, the author suggests that a legal best interests analysis that includes quality of life consideration may actually involve the use of criteria similar to those supported by the authors of the controversial moral theories that negate the personhood of seriously handicapped newborns. The author ultimately concludes that a clear divide between the legal definition of the ’person’ and the moral and social perceptions of that term is misleading. » (p. 2)