Marital Property Laws and Women’s Labour Supply

Marital Property Laws and Women’s Labour Supply

Marital Property Laws and Women’s Labour Supply

Marital Property Laws and Women’s Labour Supplys

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Référence bibliographique [21154]

Lluis, Stephanie et Pan, Yazhuo. 2018. Marital Property Laws and Women’s Labour Supply. Waterloo (Ontario): Université de Waterloo, Département d’économie.

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Fiche synthèse

1. Objectifs

Intentions :
«In this paper, [the authors] study the effect of a redistributive divorce law on the labour supply of married women and on couples’ marital decisions in Canada.» (p. 2)

Questions/Hypothèses :
The «main research question applies to three outcomes: Did the change in the redistribution of resources within couples influence [t]he labour force participation and hours of work of married women, [d]ivorce transitions, and […] the marital decision of young and never married individuals regarding whom to marry.» (p. 2-3)

2. Méthode

Échantillon/Matériau :
The authors «use a difference-in-difference approach and exploit information on female labour supply and marital status from the Canadian Labour Force Survey data to analyze outcomes before and after the reforms in Quebec, relative to other provinces.» (p. 2)

Instruments :

Type de traitement des données :
Analyse statistique

3. Résumé

«Consistent with the prediction of the bargaining model of marital decisions […], family patrimony rules that improve economic equality between spouses reduce married women’s hours of work. [The authors] estimate a decline of about 22 hours per year. This effect is larger among married women with stronger attachment to the labour force. The estimated decline in hours for the group of women employed before the law change is 36 hours per year. In addition, [the authors] also find that the adverse employment effect of the Quebec changes in family patrimony rules is relatively stronger for less educated women (the most disadvantaged spouse) and among couples with larger wealth as measured by the ownership of the couples’ property. [They] investigate this question by studying the Quebec amendment impact on divorce rates and the decisions of whom to marry. [They] find that the redistributive law change had no impact on overall divorce but significantly increased the likelihood of divorce/separations among less educated spouses. In addition, over the sample of young individuals deciding whether or not to marry, the Civil Code amendment contributed to increasing the proportion of marriages in which the wife is more educated than the husband. Together these results suggest that family reforms with the goal of promoting economic equality between spouses in the long-run, may create unintended short-run vulnerabilities.» (p. 27-28)