The Judicialization of Assisted Reproductive Technology Policy in Canada: Decentralization, Medicalization, and Mandatory Regulation

The Judicialization of Assisted Reproductive Technology Policy in Canada: Decentralization, Medicalization, and Mandatory Regulation

The Judicialization of Assisted Reproductive Technology Policy in Canada: Decentralization, Medicalization, and Mandatory Regulation

The Judicialization of Assisted Reproductive Technology Policy in Canada: Decentralization, Medicalization, and Mandatory Regulations

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Référence bibliographique [11900]

Snow, Dave. 2012. «The Judicialization of Assisted Reproductive Technology Policy in Canada: Decentralization, Medicalization, and Mandatory Regulation ». Revue canadienne Droit et Société / Canadian Journal of Law and Society, vol. 27, no 2, p. 169-188.

Fiche synthèse

1. Objectifs


Intentions :
«Cet article examine l’incidence de deux décisions constitutionnelles récentes qui ont modifié le cours des politiques sur la procréation assistée au Canada, soit le Renvoi relatif à la Loi sur la procréation assistée (2010) et Pratten c. British Columbia (2011).» (p. 188)

2. Méthode


Échantillon/Matériau :
Données documentaires diverses

Type de traitement des données :
Réflexion critique

3. Résumé


«While the two cases seem to have little in common, this article draws several conclusions. First, for good or ill, federal authority in the area of assisted reproduction has been considerably curtailed. The criminal prohibitions remain in place, but for the time being there will likely be considerable variation among provinces. Quebec will regulate (and partially fund) IVF [in vitro fertilization]; other provinces will not. The curtailment of federal authority stems from a socially liberal conception of ’morality’ in Reference re Assisted Human Reproduction Act, in which a majority of the Supreme Court accepted a ’medicalized’ (as opposed to ’moral’) view of assisted reproduction. […] Second, the Pratten ruling suggests that courts may begin to mandate provincial action in the area of assisted reproduction. It is safe to say that a ‘right to know one’s identity’ was not foreseen by the framers of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Although Justice Adair rejected such a right, her judgment in Pratten leans in that direction, and the remedy is just as innovative. By mandating a provincial regulatory scheme for spermdonor registries, Justice Adair’s judgment that some components of assisted reproduction are ‘too important’ leave unregulated moves Charter jurisprudence into potentially uncharted territory.» (p. 186-187)